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Abstract: External financial liberalization has led to a surge in international capital flows since the 
early 1990s. While the direct growth benefits of financial openness are unclear, it has led 
developing countries to engage in costly reserve accumulation on an unprecedented scale. Although 
this offers some protection against financial crises, many developing countries have nonetheless 
experienced greater economic volatility and full-scale financial crises since the early 1990s. These 
crises have had a considerable impact on GDP and long-term growth prospects, but it appears that 
labour has suffered disproportionately as labour market indicators typically lack economic recovery. 
Furthermore, the labour share in national income is typically eroded during a financial crisis. The 
present paper, therefore, draws the conclusion that volatility in international financial markets is 
currently perhaps one of the most harmful factors for enterprises and labour in developing countries. 
Hence, the paper suggests how greater policy coherency between international and national 
financial, economic and employment policies can give greater attention to employment and 
incomes. 
JEL classification: F43; G15; J21. 
 
Résumé: Depuis le début des années 1990, la libéralisation externe a donné lieu à un accroissement 
des flux internationaux de capitaux. Bien que leurs bénéfices ne soient pas clairement établis, les 
politiques de libéralisation ont contraint les pays en développement à se lancer dans une coûteuse 
accumulation de réserves. Même si ces mesures permettent en principe de réduire les risques de 
crise financière, un grand nombre de pays en développement a néanmoins été victime d’une plus 
grande volatilité économique et de crises financières majeures. Ces crises ont eu un impact 
considérable sur le PNB et sur le potentiel de croissance à long terme, mais les indicateurs du 
marché du travail démontrent que ce sont les travailleurs qui ont souffert le plus. La part du revenu 
du travail dans le PNB a décliné de manière considérable dans les pays en crise. Le présent 
document en déduit que la volatilité des marchés financiers est probablement l’un des facteurs qui 
affectent le plus négativement les entreprises et leurs travailleurs dans les pays en développement. 
Le document montre aussi comment une plus grande cohérence des politiques adoptées, au niveau 
national et international, dans les domaines financiers, économique et de l’emploi peut contribuer à 
augmenter les revenus du travail.  
Classification JEL: F43; G15; J21. 
 
Resumen: La apertura externa financiera ha llevado a un crecimiento rápido en los flujos de capital 
desde principios de la década de los 90. Si bien los beneficios directos del crecimiento de la apertura 
financiera no son claros, ésta ha llevado a que los países en desarrollo hayan optado por la 
acumulación de reservas en una escala sin precedentes. A pesar de que ello brinda protección contra 
crisis financieras, muchos países en desarrollo han experimentado, sin embargo, mayor volatilidad 
económica y crisis financieras a gran escala desde principios de los 90. Estas crisis han tenido un 
considerable impacto en el PBI y en las proyecciones de crecimiento de largo plazo, pero parece que 
el factor trabajo ha sufrido desproporcionadamente ya que los indicadores del mercado de trabajo 
usualmente no se recuperan. Más aun, la proporción del trabajo en el ingreso nacional se ve 
usualmente perjudicada durante una crisis financiera. El documento, por tanto, concluye que la 
volatilidad en los mercados financieros internacionales es actualmente, quizá, uno de los factores 
más perjudiciales para las empresas y los trabajadores en los países en desarrollo. De ahí es que el 
documento sugiere que una mayor coherencia entre las políticas económicas y financieras, entre el 
nivel internacional y el nacional, y entre políticas económicas y de empleo, puedan atender con 
mayor énfasis al empleo y los ingresos.  
Clasificación JEL: F43; G15; J21. 
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Financial Openness and Employment:  
The Need for Coherent International and 
National Policies* 
 
 “The consequences of mistakes in financial markets, where capital is volatile and mobile 
globally, far exceeds the consequences of mistakes in the labor markets, where labor is 
largely immobile across national lines” 
Richard Freeman, Responding to Economic Crisis in a Post-Washington Consensus World: 
The Role for Labor, May 2003. 
1. Introduction: Some Characteristics of  
Financial Openness  
The current wave of globalization is characterized by a more liberal policy stance at the 
international and national levels. While policy for trade liberalization dominated the inter-
national agenda since the 1960s, policies for financial liberalization have been of a much 
more recent vintage. They have been applied in the wake of stabilization and adjustment 
policies which characterized the 1980s and early 1990s. The major expected result from fi-
nancial liberalization was that it would allow (developing) countries to utilize resources 
better and to increase capital formation, through stimulating foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and other international capital flows such as private portfolios investment. A more 
open national financial system was seen as a necessary complement to the lifting of im-
pediments to international capital flows. Over the past two decades, many countries have 
liberalized their capital accounts (see Lee and Jayadev 2005) and almost all policy meas-
ures related to foreign direct investment favoured a more open regime (see Annex Graph 1 
and 2).  
As a consequence, capital has become globally mobile – in contrast to labour, whose 
movement is still highly restricted.1 International capital flows accelerated especially since 
the mid-1990s. Worldwide gross private capital flows (the sum of the absolute values of 
foreign direct, portfolio, and other investment in- and outflows) have been equal to more 
than 20 per cent of world GDP for the past seven years, compared to less than 10 per cent 
 
 
* The authors would like to thank for comments received from colleagues around the ILO and dur-
ing seminars and discussions held in Washington, D.C. (Carnegie Endowment, April 2005), Geneva 
(Policy Coherence Initiative, December 2005), Brussels (European Commission, December 2005), 
Johannesburg (ILO sub-regional seminar, December 2005), St. Petersburg (Seventh Annual Global 
Development Conference, January 2006), The Hague (Institute of Social Studies, January 2006), 
Geneva (XXII G24 Technical Group Meeting, March 2006) and New York (DESA Development 
Forum on Productive Employment and Decent Work, May 2006). All errors are the authors’.  
1 Although labour migration has gained importance, the world’s approximately 86.3 million migrant 
workers accounted for only 3.1 per cent of the economically active population in 2000 (based on 
ILO 2004a, p. 7, and the ILO database Laborsta, EAPEP, Version 5). 
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of world GDP before 1990 (see Annex Table 1). Worldwide FDI flows, a sub-category of 
private capital flows, also rose substantially during the 1990s and equalled 4.9 per cent of 
world GDP in 2000. They have since declined, but they are still well above the level of the 
1980s or 1970s. Yet, despite this substantial increase in capital flows, a number of worry-
ing trends remain: 
i. During the surge in foreign capital flows since the 1990s, actual investment into new 
infrastructure and productive capacity stagnated. Gross fixed capital formation (the 
most commonly used measure for physical investment) equalled 22.0 per cent in 2000 
(the year when international capital flows peaked), only marginally above the level of 
the early 1990s (see Annex Table 2 and Graph 1 below). This divergence in trends can 
in part be attributed to the fact that much FDI was spent on mergers and acquisitions, 
and did not go into new factories or machinery.2 Despite the widespread perception of 
an investment boom during the 1990s, increased cross-border flows have not increased 
the overall level of investment. Gross fixed capital formation was on average actually 
lower since 1990 than in the 1980s or the 1970s.3 It is thus not surprising that world 
GDP growth, too, was slower than in previous decades (see also Graph 2 below).  
ii. Cross-border capital flows are still largely a phenomenon of developed countries. In 
2004, gross private capital flows equalled 28.4 per cent of GDP in high-income 
countries, but only 11.9 per cent of GDP in low- and middle-income countries (see 
Annex Table 1). While there was a positive balance between in- and outflows for 
developing countries as a group, these flows by-and-large bypassed the poorest 
countries since the early 1990s as over 90 per cent of the net inflows went to middle-
income countries (see Annex Table 3). FDI, as well, is highly concentrated among 
industrialized countries and a small group of middle-income countries (see Annex 
Graph 3). Low-income countries therefore still draw, to a large extent, their foreign 
resources from official development assistance which, despite lofty statements at 
various international fora, has not increased in the past 15 years.4 
iii. International capital movements have led to greater economic volatility, a trend that 
has been well documented (Diwan 2001; Prasad et al. 2003 and 2004; Cerra and 
Saxena 2005). Most research points to the direction that volatility in turn has lead to 
more frequent financial and economic crises in developing countries (while this is not 
necessarily the case for industrialized countries) (see Easterly et al. 2001; Singh 2003). 
Such crises have negative effects on growth, investment and incomes, not only in the 
short term, but also in the long run (Diwan 1999 and 2001; Cerra and Saxena 2005). 
 
 
2 UNCTAD data show that the FDI boom was in part driven by mergers and acquisitions: From 
1998 to 2001, total cross-border M&A sales were equal to more than 70 per cent of total FDI out-
ward flows, up from less than 50 percent between 1992 and 1994. See UNCTAD (2004b:  Annex 
Table B.7.) and UNCTAD (2004a).  
3 The respective figures are 21.7 per cent of GDP (1990s), 22.5 per cent of GDP (1980s) and 23.8 
per cent of GDP (1970s). See World Bank (2005a); based series “Gross fixed capital formation  
(% of GDP)”. 
4 Official development assistance and official aid (ODA/OA) to all low- and middle-income coun-
tries actually declined through most of the 1990s, falling from 65.5 billion current US$ in 1991 to a 
low of 52.3 billion US$ in 1997. The recovery thereafter brought it back to 65.3 billion US$ in 2002 
and to 76.2 billion US$ in 2003. Despite this nominal increase, ODA/OA was about equal to its 
1991 level in real terms in 2003. See World Bank (2005a); based on series “Official development 
assistance and official aid (current US$)”. 
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Hence, volatility and financial crises that are caused by financial integration should be seen 
as a serious problem for enterprises and labour – contrary to earlier views that, with proper 
national institutions and so-called safety-net programmes, countries would be able to 
withstand the medium- and long-term negative aspects of volatility and crises. 
In the light of these trends, the purpose of this paper is to review the effects of financial 
liberalization on employment and incomes. The paper will concentrate on the effects of 
volatility and crises on labour that is primarily associated with debt and portfolio equity 
flows, and less with FDI flows.5 The paper is motivated by the concern expressed by the 
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization that “[g]ains in the spheres of 
trade and FDI run the risk of being set back by financial instability and crisis” (WCSDG 
2004: 88). It draws the conclusion that volatility in international financial markets is cur-
rently perhaps one of the most harmful factors for enterprises and labour in developing 
countries, particularly in the middle-income countries that have been most prone to 
financial turmoil. Hence, the paper suggests how greater policy coherence between 
international and national economic and employment policies can give greater attention to 
employment and incomes. 
Graph 1: FDI and Investment as Share of GDP, Graph 2: World GDP Growth, 1961-2004 
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Source: World Bank, WDI, online database, as of May 2006. Source: World Bank, WDI 2003 and 2005 on CD-Rom.   
In discussing the rules, conditions and behaviour at international financial markets, differ-
ent authors use different terms to describe recent developments. In this paper, the 
following terms are employed: Financial openness6 is used as an umbrella term that 
includes both financial integration and financial liberalization. Financial liberalization in 
turn incorporates the liberalization of the capital and financial account7, but also other  
 
5 The latter is discussed in a recent ILO paper by Ajit Ghose (2004) and in two recent documents 
prepared for the ILO’s governing Body (ILO 2002 and 2004b). Ghose concludes that the “available 
empirical evidence in fact suggests that capital account liberalisation is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for inducing FDI inflows.” (Ghose 2004: 23f.). 
6 Prasad et al. (2004) use another term, namely financial globalization; this is close to what others 
and this paper call financial openness. 
7 Congruent with the literature, we henceforth use “capital account liberalization” as shorthand for 
the liberalization of the capital and financial account (while acknowledging that, strictly speaking, 
the relaxation of rules that refer to direct investment and portfolio flows should be called “financial 
account liberalization”; for the standard presentation of the Balance of Payments see IMF, 2004).  
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elements such as less or different supervision and regulation of the banking sector and 
often a liberalization of the foreign exchange rate regime. The difference between financial 
integration and financial liberalization is that the former describes a situation in which a 
country is more integrated in the world financial markets (i.e. through higher FDI/GDP 
ratio), while financial liberalization means changes in laws and regulations, which may (or 
may not) lead to greater financial integration.8  
Since this paper focuses on private capital flows (i.e. those private international 
transactions that are recorded under the balance of payments’ financial account), it will 
only make reference in passing to other important sources of foreign financing – such as 
official and private development assistance, income generated from exports and workers’ 
remittances. Although the latter are a genuinely private form of financial flows, they do not 
establish an investment position and are, therefore, recorded under the current account.9 
Using a broad definition, the World Bank estimates that remittances to developing 
countries amounted to 166.9 billion US$ in 2005, compared to 85.6 billion US$ in 2000 
and 31.2 billion US$ in 1990 (World Bank 2005a: 88). Remittances are not only a rapidly 
growing source of external finance, but they are generally continuous over the years and 
not prone to sudden reversals of direction (Ratha 2005). Moreover, they even tend to be 
countercyclical (i.e. migrants send more money home to support their families at times of 
crises) and hence help to smoothen consumption volatility. Although very large remittance 
flows can cause “Dutch disease” problems, their overall economic impact is generally 
thought to be positive (World Bank 2005a: chapters 4 and 5; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 
2005). In particular, remittances can make a significant contribution to poverty reduction 
since they often directly benefit poorer households (Adams and Page 2005). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We first discuss the effects of financial 
openness on labour (Section 2.) by looking into the effects that are moderated through a 
possible growth effect (Section 2.a), by discussion financial volatility and crises (Section 
2.b), by providing some evidence on the direct effects of financial crises on employment 
(Section 2.c), and finally by examining the effects of crises on wage shares in national in-
come (Section 2.d). A short summary of the main findings follows in Section 2.e. Some 
policy responses that could make the international financial system more conducive to the 
goal of productive employment and decent work are outlined in Section 3. by drawing on 
the report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization. Policies in 
industrialized countries, new rules for the international system and policies in developing 
countries are in turn addressed before the paper attends to the role of institutions in 
designing and implementing coherent policies. 
2. Financial Openness and Labour  
How does financial openness affect labour? In this section, we follow several lines of 
argument.  
First, we briefly review the effects of liberalization on growth. Here, two arguments are 
advanced: In addition to the potential direct positive effect of capital flows on growth (as 
countries gain additional resources that can be invested), there can also be an indirect 
 
8 It should be noted that some countries have become more financially integrated, without or with 
little financial liberalization (e.g. China), while other countries have financially liberalized but have 
not become more financially integrated – either because of geopolitical circumstances, or because 
they have been ignored by the international financial markets (various African countries would fall 
into this category). See the discussion in section 2.a. 
9 Hence, the statistics presented e.g. in Annex Table 1 and 3 exclude workers’ remittances. See the 
classification in IMF (1993) and the technical discussion in World Bank (2005a: 105ff.) 
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negative effect on growth. In particular, financial liberalization forces countries to hold a 
larger amount of foreign reserves which reduces incomes and growth potential. If financial 
flows have, on balance, a positive impact on growth, this would be generally beneficial for 
labour, while slow growth is usually disadvantageous for labour. However, even in the 
case of fast or steady growth, the distributional impact on different categories of labour 
needs to be taken into account. Labour might be benefiting less than appropriate and nec-
essary for long term institutional and human capital development.  
Secondly, we look into the effects of international financial flows on volatility, and their 
role in provoking financial crises. If financial crises become more frequent, their negative 
consequences for growth (both in the short and long run) could cancel out any benefits 
from financial liberalization, or even lead to a net negative effect of financial openness on 
growth. Moreover, financial crises can have impacts on labour that go over and above their 
general economic impact. Since, as indicted above, volatility and the frequency of financial 
crises have increased, we review their direct impact on employment. This is followed by a 
discussion of wage shares, and how they have evolved during crises, and a summary of the 
main findings. 
2.a  Financial Openness and Growth 
Direct effects on growth 
A recent study by IMF researches (Prasad et al. 2004) has confirmed the main findings of 
earlier studies such as those undertaken in UNCTAD (2001): it is difficult to establish a 
robust causal relationship between financial integration and growth. In general, growth is 
more depending on the quality of domestic institutions and careful macro-economic man-
agement. Edison et al. (2004) argue in the same direction and demonstrate that the findings 
of previous research (that found a positive association between capital account openness 
and growth) crucially depended on the country coverage, the choice of time periods and 
the indicator for capital account openness. They also find evidence for a suggestion that 
was first made by Rodrik (1998), namely that conventional indicators for capital account 
openness closely proxy the reputation of a country’s government. If governance is con-
trolled for, capital account openness has no significant effect on economic performance 
(Edison et al. 2004: 243ff.). By contrast, Tornell et al. (2003) study a sub-set of countries 
with functioning financial markets (thus excluding the majority of developing countries) 
and argue that switching to a regime of de facto financial openness will ease credit con-
straints, which leads to higher growth but also increased risk of financial crises. By their 
account, the growth effect outweighs the cost of crises. This result runs counter to the 
findings presented by Lee and Jayadev (2005) who use a de jure measure of capital ac-
count liberalization (rather than a de facto measure that reflects the success in attracting 
inflows). For the period from 1973-1995 (i.e. even when excluding the negative impact of 
the East Asian crisis), they find no positive effect on growth rates and, contrary to theory, 
some indication that openness reduces the investment share in GDP. 
The conflicting results could in part be caused by differences in country coverage, but also 
by differences between the indicators employed in the literature. Prasad et al. (2004) and 
Collins (2005) highlight the crucial difference between “de jure” or “de facto” measures of 
financial openness. “De jure” financial openness (or financial liberalization) includes 
abolishment or changes in rules and regulations concerning foreign capital, as it is often 
required as part of the conditionality for financial support by the International Financial 
Institutions. Many countries in Latin America fall under this category. By contrast, “de 
facto” financial openness (or financial integration) relates to increases in a financial open-
ness indicator, irrespective of whether rules have changed or not (India and China, but also 
other Asian countries fall into this category.) In the latter case, the causal relationship 
between financial openness and growth is more difficult to establish. Did financial 
 6 Working Paper No. 75  
integration lead to higher growth or did higher growth induce financial integration? Rodrik 
(2003) and Singh (2003) argue that especially for India and China, growth induced greater 
financial integration. Policy discussions should therefore emphasize firstly appropriate 
growth strategies, and, in the light of those, consider various variants of liberalization. 
Tokman (2003) for example argues that slow growth cum liberalization in Latin America 
has led to a greater informalization of the work force, persistent poverty and greater 
inequality. 
Another factor to explain the difference in results could be the different impact of financial 
openness across countries. As Edison et al. (2004) argue, capital account liberalization can 
be beneficial to middle-income countries under certain conditions, while low-income coun-
tries with a poor regulatory framework and inadequate institutions have little to gain. The 
importance of institutions and the policy framework as a pre-condition for capital account 
liberalizations is also pointed out by Gilbert et al. (2001). They conclude that “[b]y itself, 
capital account liberalisation will deliver relatively little” while leaving poor countries 
more vulnerable to crisis (ibid.: 121). An even more pessimistic view emerges from the 
study by Lee and Jayadev (2005) who find that even when the most commonly mentioned 
pre-conditions are met, capital account liberalization has, overall, no positive effect on 
growth.  
While the argument that the impact of financial flows depends on country characteristics is 
most frequently applied to portfolio equity and short-term debt flows, it has also been 
made for FDI. Ghose (2004) found that the effects of FDI on the host country crucially 
depended on country specific circumstances, in particular whether they met an unmet de-
mand for investment finance (e.g. to build up export-oriented manufacturing industry). 
However, FDI does not always add to the productive capacity of the recipient country, but 
can also crowd out domestic investment when foreign entrepreneurs seize upon investment 
opportunities that would have otherwise been taken up by domestic enterprises (Ghose 
2004). A similar point is made by Hanson in a paper for the G24 technical secretariat; he 
argues that “[t]here is weak evidence that FDI generates positive spillovers for host 
economies” (Hanson 2001: 23). The overall effects of FDI on employment are mixed, as 
an ILO Governing Body paper suggests: 
 “When viewed together, the findings from empirical research show that employment effects 
of FDI inflows to developing countries are rather weak and are not unambiguously positive or 
negative. Such inflows at best make a weak contribution to increasing the rate of investment in 
recipient countries. At the same time, a rising share of FDI in total investment tends to reduce 
the overall employment elasticity while shifting the pattern of labour demand in favour of 
high-skilled labour. Rising wage inequality is also a consequence. On the positive side, a ris-
ing share of FDI in total investment leads to an improvement in the average quality of em-
ployment for both high-skilled and low-skilled labour.” (ILO 2004b: p. 10, para. 35) 
Indirect growth effects through increased reserve holdings 
As a consequence of financial openness and of the instability of the current international 
financial system, developing countries have been increasingly building up foreign reserves 
since the early 1990s. For some countries these reserves were created by surplus on the 
current account, while others built up reserves through capital inflows which were not 
spent on foreign goods. As Feldstein (1999) argues, increasing international liquidity is an 
effective ‘self help’-strategy in the absence of an international lender of last resort. 
However, while giving countries some protection against financial crises, holding large 
international reserves is also a costly strategy as foreign reserves are held in low interest 
bearing instruments such as US treasury bills, rather than earning much higher returns on 
the capital market or through investment into human or physical capital. Baker and 
Walentin (2001) estimate that the increased reserve level of the late 1990s compared to 
that common in the 1960s implies an annual cost of around 1 per cent of GDP in most 
regions, and of between 1.2 and 2.5 per cent in East Asia and the Pacific. They argue that 
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the gains of trade liberalization in terms of higher GDP growth were actually “eaten up” 
for most countries in the 1990s by the earning forgone on holding higher reserves (ibid.). 
In a more recent study, Rodrik (2006) estimates that the cost of increased reserve holdings 
is 1 per cent of GDP on average for developing countries. While imposing costs on 
developing countries, increased reserve holdings are indirect subsidy to the countries in 
whose currency the reserves are held (see Stiglitz 2000).  
What is striking, however, is that the trend of the 1990s has accelerated in the first years of 
the current century to a somewhat alarming level (see Graph 3). Overall, reserves held by 
low- and middle-income countries were equal to 20.7 per cent of their GNI in 2004, com-
pared to 6.9 per cent in the first half of the 1990s – a threefold increase.10 The substantial 
increase took place in low- and in middle-income developing countries alike, and across 
regions. Even a poor region like sub-Saharan Africa now holds foreign reserves equal to 
13.0 per cent of its GNI, more than double compared to the first half of the 1990s. The 
trend is particularly strong in South Asia and in East Asia and the Pacific. In the latter 
region, the growth of reserves is only in part driven by China (the developing country with 
the largest foreign reserves). Even when China is excluded, there remains a substantial 
increase from an already high 15.1 per cent of GNI (1990-94) to 26.0 per cent in 2004 for 
the rest of the region (see Annex Table 4). 
Graph 3: Reserve Holdings by Developing Countries, 1970-2004 (in % of GNI) 
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Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance 2005, online database (Washington, DC, as of 
May 2006); based on series ‘International Reserves (US$)’ and ‘Gross National Income (US$)’. 
Part of the explanation for the accelerated build-up of international reserves is that devel-
oping countries, particularly those from Asia, accumulated reserves after the financial cri-
ses of the late 1990s in order not to be obliged to request support from international finan-
cial institutions in times of future crises (see Bird and Mandilaras 2005). In a recent cross-
country study, Aizenman and Lee (2006) find that changed risk perception after the Mexi-
can and the East Asian crises (as proxied by dummy variables) and the degree of capital 
account openness are indeed the main factors behind the surge in reserve levels. By con-
trast, variables linked to export promotion regimes, such as a depreciated real exchange 
rate and high lagged export growth rates, had only a small (yet statistically significant) im-
pact on reserve levels. The results also confirm that China is not an outlier with respect to 
the level of its international reserves (ibid.: 3). This refutes arguments that attribute 
China’s reserve levels to the country’s exchange rate policies (see e.g. Dooley et al. 2003; 
 
10 By contrast, foreign reserves have remained at under 5 per cent of GDP in industrialized countries 
(Rodrik 2006: 15). 
 8 Working Paper No. 75  
Goldstein 2003). As Prasad and Wei (2005) demonstrate, the recent steep rise in China’s 
foreign reserves is mostly due to large non-FDI capital inflows, and not to the current 
account surplus or FDI. 
2.b Financial Openness, Volatility and Crises 
Prasad et al. (2004) made also another pertinent observation, namely that financial liberali-
zation in developing countries is associated with higher consumption volatility and in-
creased GDP volatility than in developed countries. This observation is consistent with 
those of many other researchers (see e.g. Kose et al. 2003; Levchenko 2005), and espe-
cially with those who emphasize the need for stronger institutions as a precondition for de-
velopment. Kaminsky et al. (2004) pointed out that the absence of sound financial regula-
tion, both at the national and international levels, makes developing countries much more 
vulnerable to negative impacts of capital flows. When institutions with the ability to man-
age greater volatility are absent or not fully effective, the generally procyclical nature of 
international capital flows (“when it rains it pours”-syndrome) adds to the effects of fiscal 
policies, and, to a certain extent, also macroeconomic polices, that tend to be procyclical in 
most developing countries. Such procyclical behaviour deepens and prolongs a crisis.  
Other research confirms that developing countries have indeed become more prone to both 
currency and banking crises after financial liberalization (see e.g. Weller 2001; Tornell et 
al. 2003). Countries from across East Asia and Latin America have suffered from such 
crises during the 1990s and thereafter, with the Argentinean crisis of 2000/01 being a par-
ticularly bold example. Other countries, such as Russia and Turkey, have also been 
severely affected.11 When crises break out, they often cannot primarily be explained by any 
deterioration in a country’s so-called ‘fundamentals’. Rather, they can occur as a result of 
volatility in international capital markets that leads to changes in risk perceptions and risk 
averseness of investors and creditors. Second generation models of financial crises have 
investigated this channel of contagion in great detail, and argued that a crisis can spread 
from one country to another even when there are few economic linkages between them 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000; van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001; Caramazza et al. 2004; 
Goldstein and Pauzner 2004).  
Financial crises typically have a large impact on the real economy. In the five countries 
most affected by the East Asian crisis of 1997/98, GDP per capita fell between 2.8 per cent 
(Philippines) and 14.8 per cent (Indonesia). In Latin America, the Mexican crisis of 
1994/95 led to a decline in incomes by 7.8 per cent, and the Argentinean crisis of 2001/02 
reduced the country’s per capita incomes by 16.3 per cent.12 A recent study by Hutchinson 
and Noy (2005) documents that so-called “sudden stop” crises (a reversal in capital flows 
and a simultaneous currency crisis) have a particular harmful effect on output – over and 
above that of ‘normal’ currency crises. On average, they cause a cumulative output loss of 
13 to 15 per cent of GDP over a three-year period. One important factor behind this 
trajectory is often the disarray financial crises cause in the banking sector. Burdened with 
non-performing loans, the domestic banks fail to perform their function of providing credit 
at a time when it is most needed. An extreme case of a prolonged credit crunch is Mexico, 
were real credit continued falling until 2002 – eight years after the crisis of 1994 (see 
Tornell et al. 2003: 54ff.).  
 
11 For a comprehensive overview see Capario and Klingebiel (2003). 
12 See World Bank (2005a); based on series “GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)”. 
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Graph 4: Typical Growth Path after a Financial Crisis in Rich and Poor Countries 
 
Source: Cerra and Saxena (2005: 24) 
Financial crises can therefore have long-term implications, although there is some contro-
versy about how big and permanent the costs of financial crises are. Tornell et al. (2003: 
23) argue that crises “are the price that has to be paid in order to attain faster growth”, and 
that that it is possible for GDP growth to recover rapidly from a crisis (although this need 
not happen and actually did not happen in Mexico, the case they study in more detail). The 
view that crises pose only a temporary set-back is challenged by Cerra and Saxena (2005), 
who deconstruct what they call the ‘myth of recovery’ by using panel data for broad data-
sets of countries. They document that recessions are typically not followed by high-growth 
recovery phases, either immediately following the trough, over several years of the subse-
quent expansion, or even over the complete subsequent expansion that follows a complete 
recession (see Graph 4). Indeed, for most countries, growth is significantly lower in the re-
covery phase than in an average expansion year. Thus, when output drops, it tends to 
remain well below its previous trend. As they argue,  
“political and financial crises are costly at all horizons. Financial crises contribute to half of 
the episodes of negative growth, and there is no evidence that they typically lead to economic 
reforms or policy adjustments that restore output to trend. Change to a more democratic gov-
ernment system, on the other hand, improves the rebound from a recession. We also find evi-
dence that while trade liberalization increases the long-run growth rate, it can weaken recovery 
from recession. However, such weak recoveries tend to occur in combination with liberalized 
capital account regimes.” (Cerra and Saxena 2005: 24) 
Another important point the authors make is that frequent crises and instabilities prevent a 
smooth convergence process as the neoclassical growth literature indicates:  
“When shocks derail growth, incomes [between countries] diverge. Poor countries have re-
spectable expansion, and therefore do not appear to be stuck in a poverty trap. However, many 
poor countries do appear to be mired in a crisis trap. Countries that experience many negative 
shocks to output tend to get left behind and their long-term growth suffers. Thus, while stan-
dard growth theory may work well in explaining expansion, a fruitful direction for future re-
search would be to explain the proclivity to wars, crises, and other negative shocks.” (Cerra 
and Saxena 2005: 24) 
This is related to the point Rodrik (2003) makes, namely that policies for stimulating 
growth are different from policies to sustain growth and that frequent crises require fre-
quent policy regime switches.  
 10 Working Paper No. 75  
2.c Financial Openness, Crises and Employment 
Financial crises are generally not only associated with an economic decline, but also with 
severe social costs. These are most prominently felt in terms of rising open unemployment, 
falling employment-to-population ratios, falling real wages, or a combination of the above 
(see e.g. Lee 1998). Moreover, the social costs can usually be felt longer than the economic 
impact: Even when GDP per capita has recovered to pre-crisis level, the other indicators 
usually lack behind (see World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization 
2004: 40f.). This pattern can be observed in a majority of countries that were most affected 
by the financial crises of the past decade. Mapping the observed trends against a counter-
factual with limited financial openness and no financial crises would, from an analytical 
perspective, of course be the empirical strategy of choice. However, such a counterfactual 
is excessively difficult to construct. Taking countries with a lower de facto openness, e.g. 
in sub-Saharan Africa, as a reference point would also be imprudent since initial conditions 
in the region differ systematically from those in East Asia or Latin America (be it with 
respect to human capital endowments, institutional capacity or industrial diversification). 
The following paragraphs therefore compare the situation before to that after a financial 
crisis and provide some of the most salient examples. 
Impact of financial crises on employment in Latin America  
and Turkey 
Latin American countries experienced several periods of financial turbulence since the 
early 1990s. The most prominent examples are the Mexican “Tequila crisis” during 
1994/95 and the currency crisis in several South American countries in the aftermath of the 
East Asian and Russian crises. One of the crisis-hit countries was Brazil, which has experi-
enced large foreign capital inflows from 1994 onwards, when the Real Plan had introduced 
a new stable currency (see Cinquetti 2000). To prevent an over-appreciation of the Real, 
inflows were temporarily taxed, but these taxes were gradually phased out and inflows 
continued at high levels. When the investor sentiment swung suddenly after the Russian 
debt default of August 1998, Brazil responded by tightening its monetary policy in an 
effort to defend the exchange rate. Even though interest rates reached 40 per cent in late 
1998, the capital flows out of Brazil were massive and depleted the country’s reserves by 
30 billion US$ within 50 days (see Averbug 2002: 930f.). When outflows reached 1 billion 
US$ per day in January 1999, the Central Bank allowed the Real to devalue massively over 
the following weeks (ibid.). The currency crisis, in combination with the recessionary 
impact of high real interest rates, led to a relatively modest decline of per capita incomes 
that nonetheless was accompanied by an increase in unemployment from 7.8 per cent in 
1997 to 9.6 per cent in 1999 (see Graph 5). Despite the subsequent economic recovery, 
unemployment rates have not recovered and remained close to ten per cent in 2003. 
Like other emerging economies, Chile received large international capital inflows in the 
beginning of the 1990s. But unlike most other countries, Chile reacted by imposing con-
trols on capital inflows in the form of an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR).13 Al-
though it is uncertain whether this augmented the overall amount of inflows, research 
shows that it reduced speculative capital inflows: the share of short-term debt in total ex-
ternal debt fell from an already low level of 19.4 per cent in 1990 to 4.8 per cent in 1997 – 
at a time when other countries increasingly relied on short-term financing (de Gregorio et 
al. 2000: 70f.). At the onset of the Asian crisis, Chile was thus considerably less exposed to 
international volatility. Also, the peso was at the lower (appreciated) end of the exchange 
 
13 The URR was introduced in June 1991 and in place until June 1998. It acted like a tax on inflows 
and allowed for a differential between world interest rates and those in Chile, while keeping inflows 
under control (see de Gregorio et al. 2000). 
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rate band at the time, leaving room for a relatively large devaluation within the band. 
However, the Central Bank feared that a depreciation could endanger the inflation target. 
Therefore, it defended the peso against growing pressure with a mix of monetary tighten-
ing and interventions on the foreign exchange market, before finally allowing the peso to 
float in September 1999 (Morandé and Tapia 2002: 5).  
Graph 5: Medium-Term Effects of Financial Crises on Unemployment in Latin American 
Countries 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005, series “GDP per capita (constant 2000 USD)”; 
International Labour Office, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 4th edition. 
Solimano and Larraín (2002: 17f.) argue that the Central Bank effectively prioritized 
“[l]ower inflation over higher growth and employment” (ibid.). The high interest rates had 
indeed recessionary impact, and unemployment increased from 5.3 per cent in 1997 to 8.9 
per cent in 1999. While GDP per capita regained its 1998 level in 2000, unemployment 
had only modestly recovered by 2003 (when it still stood at 7.4 per cent). Solimano and 
Larraín (2002) discuss several hypotheses that could explain the sluggish employment per-
formance, among them firm-restructuring, continued job losses in small and medium en-
terprises (SMEs) and the noticeably slower rate of GDP growth after the crisis. They warn 
that unemployment could become a structural problem in Chile unless capital formation 
accelerates (ibid.: 28f.). 
Following the liberalization in Mexico, financial inflows expanded rapidly in the early 
1990s, but dried up and eventually reversed in 1994. Gunther et al. (1996) argue that these 
flows were the major determinant of Mexico’s reserve position and exchange rate. The 
peso devaluation of December 1994 (see Ibarra 1999) brought the recently privatized, al-
ready fragile banking system into considerable difficulty as the peso value of foreign de-
nominated debt changed overnight. Similarly, the balance sheet positions of companies 
which had accumulated debt in US dollars deteriorated rapidly (see Carstens and Schwartz 
1998; Mishkin 1999), which in turn led to a sharp fall in investment by the affected compa-
nies (Aguiar 2005). Taken together, this can explain how a currency crisis rapidly turned 
into a crisis of the real economy and provoked a recession with an eight percent drop in per 
capita income in 1995. Unemployment, that had been relatively stable at around three per 
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Graph 6: Medium-Term Effects of the 
Turkish Financial Crises on Unemployment  
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005, 
series “GDP per capita (constant 2000 USD)”; International 
Labour Office, KILM, 4th edition. 
cent before the crisis, started to increase during 1994 and averaged 5.8 per cent in 1995, 
almost twice the pre-crisis rate. However, these figures still mask the loss of jobs in the 
formal sector since the share of informal employment rose from 30 percent in 1993 to 35 
per cent in 1995 (KILM, 4th edition). The economic recovery was relatively fast, and by 
1997 Mexico had achieved its pre-crisis income level. Unemployment was still above pre-
crisis level, but fell to 2.9 per cent in 1998, lagging the economic recovery by only one 
year. However, at 32 per cent, the share of informal employment was still above the pre-
crisis level that year. 
The case of Argentina stands out for the country went through two financial crises, in 1995 
(when investors withdrew capital following the Tequila crisis in Mexico) and again in 
2001/02, leading to the collapse of the currency board (see Daseking et al. 2004). The first 
crisis only caused relatively mild downturn, and, with considerable foreign support, pre-
crisis income levels were again reached in 1996 (see Damill et al. 2002: 9ff.). As in other 
countries, the unemployment rate (that covers only urban areas in the case of Argentina) 
was still far above the pre-crisis level at this point, but it was approaching its 1994 level by 
1998. The recession that set in that year meant, however, that unemployment increased 
again and never fully recovered to its pre-crisis level. Argentina therefore went into the 
2001/02 crisis with an already high level of (urban) unemployment (15 per cent in 2000), 
that rose to almost 20 per cent by 2002.14 Economic turbulence and the cumulative effects 
of two financial crises have thus caused a substantial unemployment problem in a country 
where unemployment rates had fluctuated around five per cent for most of the 1980s 
(KILM, 4th ed.). 
In Turkey, the frequency of crises was 
even higher than in Argentina. The 
country had liberalized its economy 
throughout the 1980s, but embarked on 
full capital account liberalization only in 
August 1989. Since, capital flows have 
been highly volatile and have contributed 
to the repeated crises that affected the 
country in 1994, 1998/99 and 2001. As 
Demir (2004) argues, the country went 
into a vicious cycle of crises, where the 
loss in output reduced public revenues 
and increased public borrowing through 
short-term treasury bills that were bought 
by domestic banks, which re-financed 
themselves through short-term loans 
from abroad – building up currency risks 
and setting the stage for the next crisis. 
Further, the resulting high real interest rates reduced investment and prospects for long-
term growth (see also Akyüz and Boratav 2003). Whereas recovery from the first crisis in 
1994 was relatively smooth – both in terms of GDP and employment –, the second and 
especially the third crisis proved to be more severe. Their combined effect meant that per 
capita incomes were still at their 1997/98  
 
 
14 Unfortunately, the methodology of the Argentina’s Permanent Household Survey changed signifi-
cantly in 2003 so that the unemployment rate of 15.6 per cent that is given in KILM 4th edition is 
not directly comparable to the previous data.  
 Working Paper No. 75 13 
level in 2003 (see Graph 6). Unemployment peaked briefly during 1999 and was back at its 
previous level of around 6.6 per cent in 2000, before the next crisis set in. The third crisis 
led to a dramatic rise in unemployment: it reached 10.6 per cent in 2002, at a time when 
incomes had almost recovered to their pre-crisis level, and remained in excess of ten per 
cent in 2003 and 2004. The pattern that employment recovery lags economic recovery is 
thus found in the last crisis, but not in the earlier, somewhat milder crises. 
The employment impact of the East Asian crisis  
That financial crises typically translate into crises of the real economy is also clearly evi-
dent from the experience of East Asia. Here, both output and capacity utilization fell 
sharply during the 1997/98 crisis. In a survey of firms in Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, entrepreneurs list the drop in domestic demand, rising costs for imported inputs, 
and the high interest rates as the most important reasons (see Dwor-Frécaut et al. 2000: 
Ch. 1). The declining capacity utilization had adverse impacts on the average profitability 
and liquidity of firms, and many companies abandoned or scaled down planned 
investments (ibid.: passim). Interest rate and currency shocks also forced many companies 
into bankruptcy as they found themselves unable to service their debt, much of which was 
in foreign currency (Kawai et al. 2000: 77ff.). Data from five countries worst affected by 
the East Asian crisis show that also many of the surviving firms reduced their workforce in 
1998, while only a small fraction hired more staff (see Dwor-Frécaut et al. 2000: 4f.). 
Accordingly, unemployment increased throughout the region, and incomes fell – in some 
cases dramatically, pushing people below the poverty line. According to ILO estimates, the 
number of working poor in South East Asia (using the threshold of 1 US$ per day) rose 
from its pre-crisis level of 33.7 million in 1996 to 50.6 million at the height of the financial 
crisis in 1998 – an increase of almost 17 million (see Kapsos 2004: 14f.). 
A more detailed look at the country level shows that, at the beginning of the East Asian fi-
nancial crisis in 1997, Thailand, Korea and Malaysia had virtually achieved full employ-
ment with unemployment rates of close to 1.0 per cent (Thailand) or 2.5 per cent (Korea 
and Malaysia) (see Graph 7). By 1998, the combination of production cut-backs and lay-
offs through bankruptcies had brought unemployment to 3.4 per cent in Thailand, or 1.1 
million (up from 0.3 million). In addition, about 0.2 million workers left the labour force 
despite strong growth of the working age population (KILM, 4th edition). Many workers 
had to find a new source of income in the informal economy which grew significantly 
during the crisis. This development is mirrored by a rise in the number of self-employed by 
0.8 million. Hidden unemployment in the form of underemployment also increased almost 
two-fold (from 2.3 million to 4.4 million). A further effect of the crisis was a decline in 
real wages by 4 per cent within a year (see Mahmood and Aryah 2001: 266ff.)15.  
In Korea, thirteen large conglomerates became insolvent during 1997. Delays in payments 
by the large corporations dragged many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) into the cri-
sis; 8,200 of them failed in 1997 and a further 10,500 in 1998 (see Kawai et al. 2000: 77ff). 
The Korean labour market suffered severely from the wave of redundancies that accompa-
nied these bankruptcies, and the reduction in the work force of surviving companies. Open 
unemployment rose to 7 per cent or 1.5 million (up from 0.6 million), a level not seen in 
decades. Among the hardest-hit groups were manual production workers and those in 
clerical grades. By the first quarter of 1999, total employment had fallen to 19 million, 
down by 2.1 million from the fourth quarter of 1997 (see Kang et al. 2001: 98f.). The dis-
parity between the growth in unemployment and the far larger decline in employment can 
be attributed to the fact that around 350,000 workers (in particular women) left the labour 
 
15 Women in urban areas suffered a disproportionate wage loss (-10.5 per cent), and workers in 
manufacturing (-13 per cent) and constriction (-24 per cent) were also badly affected (Mahmood 
and Aryah 2001: 267). 
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force altogether, resulting in a decline of the labour force participation rate by almost two 
percentage points (KILM, 4th edition). The increase in unemployment was less dramatic in 
Malaysia, where the rate rose by less than a percentage point. Nonetheless, around 250,000 
formal sector jobs were lost in 1998 (see Jomo 2001: 34 and Table 26). Many of the 
retrenched workers were foreign migrant workers, which cushioned the effect on the 
domestic labour market (see Mansor et al. 2001: 144f.). ILO data also show that 
agricultural employment expanded by 135,000 in 1998. The absorption of labour by the 
primary sector helped to contain the rise in open unemployment, but contributed to falling 
labour productivity in agriculture (KILM, 4th edition, and WDI 2005). 
Graph 7: Medium-Term Effects of the East Asian Financial Crises on Unemployment  
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005, series “GDP per capita (constant 2000 USD)”; 
International Labour Office, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 4th edition. 
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Indonesia (4.7 per cent unemployment in 1997) and the Philippines (7.9 per cent) went into 
the financial crisis with considerably higher unemployment, but their situation worsened 
further. In Indonesia, about 2.5 million workers lost their jobs in 1997/1998, 1 million in 
manufacturing alone (see Islam et al. 2001: 50ff.). The fall in industry and services em-
ployment was offset by an expansion of agriculture employment, so that open unemploy-
ment grew only modestly during 1998 (+0.8 percentage points) despite strong labour force 
growth. However, unemployment continued to rise in subsequent years and reached 9.1 per 
cent in 2002, the most recent year for which data are available. Real earnings also fell by 
about 40 per cent during the crisis and were still about 10 per cent below their pre-crisis 
level in 2000 (Dhanani and Islam 2004: 29f.). In the Philippines, where the crisis only had 
a comparatively mild economic impact, unemployment rose to 9.6 per cent in 1998 (+1.7 
percentage points). It has since remained at levels close to 10 per cent. 
The East Asian experience, too, shows that progress in returning to pre-crisis unemploy-
ment is generally far slower than the pace of economic recovery.16 Korea, Malaysia and the 
Philippines had all reached their pre-crisis per capita GDP in 1999 or 2000, but unem-
ployment remained above pre-crisis level at that point in time. In Korea, the country with 
the strongest post-crisis output growth, unemployment rates were close to their pre-crisis 
level only in 2002 (lagging the economic recovery by three years). One factor behind this 
relative success is the active policy response by the Korean government that invested con-
siderable resources (about 2.2 per cent of GDP in 1998) to assist the unemployed, to create 
new jobs, and to expand public employment services (see Kang et al. 2001: 109ff.). How-
ever, progress has not been sustained in 2003, when unemployment rose marginally. By 
contrast, there is still no sign of return to pre-crisis unemployment rates in either Malaysia 
or the Philippines. This makes the prospect of a return to pre-crisis unemployment levels 
seem uncertain – despite economic consolidation. In Thailand, the economic recovery was 
completed in 2002. At 1.8 per cent, unemployment has been reduced to about half of its 
peak in 1998 (although this is still twice the pre-crisis level). The picture is most devastat-
ing for Indonesia, where per capita incomes are still below their 1997 level and the unem-
ployment rate continues to rise. It stood at 9.1 per cent in 2002, also roughly twice its pre-
crisis level.  
2.d Financial Openness, Financial Crises and  
Labour Shares  
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that sees the labour share in GDP as constant, re-
search by Diwan (2001) and Harrison (2002) shows that the proportion of GDP that goes 
into wages and other labour income is variable over time. Using a data set from 1960 to 
1997, Harrison (2002) splits her sample of over 100 countries into two even groups (based 
on GDP per capita in 1985). Her data show that, in the group of poorer countries, labour’s  
 
 
16 The negative impact of financial crises on employment indicators can also be observed in Russia 
in the aftermath of the Rouble collapse of August 1998 and in industrialized countries like Sweden 
and Finland, which were both affected by banking crises during the early 1990s. In the case of 
Finland, the collapse of the Russian export market was another significant factor behind the eco-
nomic downturn, but all three cases showed a higher level of unemployment even after the crises 
has been over and the economy had recovered to its pre-crisis income levels (documentation avail-
able upon request).  
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share in national income fell on average by 0.1 percentage points per year prior to 1993. 
The decline in the labour share was more rapid after 1993, when it started to fall by an 
average by 0.3 percentage points per year. In the richer sub-group, the labour share grew 
by 0.2 percentage points prior to 1993, but then fell by 0.4 percentage points per year. 
These means indicate a trend reversal for the richer countries post-1993, and an 
acceleration of an already downward trend for the poorer sub-group.  
After establishing a declining trend of the labour share for many countries, Harrison (2002) 
tested for factors that can explain changes in labour shares, combining detailed national 
accounts data from the United Nations with measures of trade openness, capital account 
restrictions and capital flows. Overall, the results suggest that changes in factor shares are 
primarily linked to changes in capital/labour ratios. However, measures of globalization 
(such as capital controls or direct investment flows) also play a role. Harrison found that 
exchange rate crises lead to declining labour shares, suggesting that labour pays a 
disproportionately high price when there are large swings in exchange rates (i.e., wages are 
more severely affected than GDP).17 Capital controls are associated with an increase in the 
labour share, an effect that Harrison (ibid.: 20) attributes to the stronger bargaining 
position of capital vis-à-vis labour since the cost of relocating production increases with 
capital controls.18 In addition, increasing trade is associated with a fall in the labour share. 
This result is robust across specifications. Other factors, such as government spending, also 
matter. Increasing government spending is associated with an increase in labour shares, for 
both rich and poor countries. Finally, foreign investment inflows are associated with a fall 
in the labour share (ibid.). These results point to a systematic negative relationship between 
various measures of globalization and the labour share. 
The overall decline in the labour share is partly explained by what some call the ratchet 
effect: After an economic shock or a financial crisis, it has been a well-established fact that 
the labour share in gross national income decreases (van der Hoeven and Saget 2004: 201). 
In the 1980s some authors argued that the decline in labour share after the economic 
shocks was, in effect, the consequence of a too high labour share before the crisis in the 
1980s and thus partly blaming labour for the build-up of the crisis. However, only in a 
minority of cases have financial crises been caused by bidding up wages and labour shares. 
In most cases the crisis was caused by external events or rent-seeking behaviour of capital 
owners. In a study of the manufacturing sector, Amsden and van der Hoeven (1996) there-
fore conclude that “forcing firms to restructure under the highly contractionary (and desta-
bilising) conditions [of the 1980s] stymies rather than stimulates change”. And based upon 
a large sample of developing countries, they argue that “[g]iven what appears to have been 
an absence of thorough going industrial restructuring in most non-Asian developing coun-
tries in the 1980s, the decade’s decline in real wages, and its fall in wage share of value 
added, suggest that what mainly happened in the manufacturing sector was a redistribution 
 
17 These findings confirm those by Diwan (2001). He reports, based on a large sample of countries, 
an average drop in the labour share of GDP per crisis of 5.0 percentage points, and a modest catch-
up thereafter. In the three years after the crisis, labour shares were still 2.6 percentage points below 
their pre-crisis average (Diwan 2001: 6). Given the fact that most countries have undergone more 
than one crisis, the cumulative drop in the wage share over the last 30 years is estimated at 4.1 per 
cent of GDP, and is especially large for Latin America where the figure reached 6.7 per cent of 
GDP over the period 1970s-1990s. Thus, since many countries have undergone more than one cri-
sis, the decline of the wage share during the crisis and the partial recovery, after the crisis has led to 
a secular decline in the wage share 
18 The weak bargaining position of labour under open capital accounts is also a causal mechanism 
explored by Lee and Jayadev (2005). They find that financial openness exerts a downward pressure 
on the labour share both in developed and developing countries for the period from 1973-1995. The 
effect is independent of the negative impact of financial crises.  
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of income from labour to capital” and the fear is expressed that “[l]ower wages, rather than 
higher productivity, may have to bear the burden of creating competitiveness in the 1990s 
as a result of unsuccessful restructuring” in the 1980s (ibid.: 522).  
2.e The Effects of Financial Openness on 
Labour: Summary of Main Findings 
On balance, the capital account liberalization that many developing countries embarked 
upon in the 1990s has delivered disappointing results. This disappointment is well summa-
rized in a recent World Bank report that reviews the growth performance of the 1990s: 
“Contrary to expectations, financial liberalization did not add much to growth, and it appears 
to have augmented the number of crises. As expected, deposits and capital inflows rose 
sharply as a result of liberalization. But, other than in a few East Asian and South Asian coun-
tries, capital markets did not provide resources for new firms. Numbers of stock market list-
ings declined, even in the newly created markets in the transition countries that were some 
times used for privatizations. Also, although relevant time-series data on access are weak, and 
contrary to expectations, it appears that access to financial services did not improve substan-
tially after liberalization.” (World Bank 2005b: 21) 
The preceding discussion, too, has shown that capital account liberalization fell not only 
far short of expectations, but did serious harm to some countries and had a disproportion-
ately negative effect on labour. Six main conclusions emerge:  
(1.) In the absence of adequate institutions, the capital account liberalization has had little 
direct benefits for growth. This is especially true for poor countries where the institutional 
gap is greatest, but also for middle-income countries where capital inflows were not used 
to fill unmet investment needs.  
(2.) However, capital account liberalization – even if managed prudently – has its cost to 
developing countries. In order to cushion the effects of sudden outflows, developing coun-
tries have sterilized inflows and built up large reserves. Since these are mainly held in low-
yield treasury bonds issued by industrialized countries, the opportunity cost of doing so is 
large.  
(3.) Nonetheless, capital account liberalization has left developing countries vulnerable to 
crisis. These are often not triggered by a sudden deterioration of a country’s so called fun-
damentals, but are an inherent property of the international financial system. The output 
losses associated with such crises are large, and even a subsequent recovery is usually in-
sufficient to bring a country back onto its old growth path. 
(4.) The negative effects of financial crisis on the labour market can be detected in a num-
ber of indicators. Open unemployment typically rises substantially during a crisis, but the 
impact can also be seen in a fall of real wages, rising underemployment and shifts of work-
ers from the formal sector towards the informal economy and agriculture.  
(5.) Moreover, labour markets typically lag the economic recovery by several years. Even 
when GDP per capita has reached its pre-crisis level, the consequences of the crisis are 
normally still evident from the employment indicators. This lag means that labour pays a 
disproportionate cost.  
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(6.) Tracking the evolution of the labour share in national income also shows that crises are 
particularly harmful for labour. As recent research indicates, financial crises have a perma-
nent negative effect on the share of labour compensation in GDP. They are thus a factor 
behind the long-term trend decline in the labour share that can particularly be observed 
from the early 1990s onwards. 
3. Financial Openness and Employment:  
The Need for Greater Policy Coherence 
The preceding sections made clear that concerns for growth, labour and employment 
should be more explicitly taken into account in the current financial system in order for it 
to perform better. Adelman (2000) argues that it might be advisable to restore a global 
financial environment which carries some of the characteristics of the so-called Golden 
Age – steady development for developing countries, combined with high stable growth for 
industrialized countries – while maintaining some of the virtues of a more liberalized trad-
ing and investment climate (ibid.: 1058). In order for such a system to function more effi-
ciently in terms of growth and employment, it must have three different sets of properties: 
• Firstly, it should provide liquidity in the international system. Liquidity is needed 
to respond to demands for foreign exchange and for foreign investment. In effect 
the downfall of the original Bretton Woods system was in part due to illiquidity of 
the system as a whole and the reliance on only one currency to provide liquidity. 
• Secondly, an international system should provide stability for global markets. As 
indicated above the absence of stability during the last decade has caused severe 
and, as some have argued, even irreparable damage to the growth potential of a 
number of developing countries. 
• Thirdly, an international financial system should provide a large degree of policy 
autonomy for participating countries. This is extremely important as countries not 
only have different factor endowments (capital, labour, and technology) but also 
different socio-economic systems. In order to find equilibrium between various 
policies to satisfy different economic and social demands, each country and society 
must be able to use the policy instruments and work with institutions which are best 
fitted to the country. This relates both to current conditionality as well as to 
difficulties countries have in applying monetary and fiscal instruments in order to 
achieve nationally determined economic and social goals. 
The major question is, therefore, whether these required properties are compatible with 
each other? There is no automatism in that different sets of policies would automatically 
achieve all three requirements (Tinbergen’s rule that the number of policy instruments 
must at least be equal to the number of policy targets remains as relevant as 50 years ago; 
see Tinbergen 1970 [1952]). A greater sense of policy coherence is therefore called for. 
We can distinguish policy coherence at, and between, three different levels in order to 
achieve an international financial system that is more cogent of concerns for employment 
and labour as discussed above. Namely, (i) policies in industrialized countries; (ii) the set 
of multilateral rules that has been developed since the Second World War; and (iii) policies 
in developing countries. 
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Policies in industrialized countries  
Despite the success of emerging economies such as India and China, policies in industri-
alized countries and their outcomes circumscribe the economic and social policies of de-
veloping countries. Hence, even if the focus of concern is to increase the importance of 
employment and labour in the process of development, policies in industrialized countries 
need to be part of such considerations. For example, the World Commission on the Social 
Dimension of Globalization (2004) has indicated the following set of policies to be ex-
tremely relevant: 
More coherent economic policies between the G3 (Europe, Japan and the United States): 
Uncoordinated fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policies have created a highly vola-
tile and instable system which is not geared towards growth and of which the spill-over 
effects for developing countries are serious.  
There is almost unanimous agreement that the US economy cannot be the eternal engine of 
growth for the rest of world. Japan and Europe should give greater reflection to growth 
through better coordination of fiscal and monetary policies and their effects on employ-
ment and growth and not rely only on export growth. This would enable the United States 
to reduce its double deficit in a soft landing without serious repercussions for growth. 
Many argue that there are more structural impediments to boosting growth in the EU, but 
tight monetary and fiscal policies are not an answer to existing structural impediments. The 
effect of the deficit rules of the European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) have thus been 
under much public debate. As Annett and Jaeger (2004) argue, an ideal fiscal rule would 
combine medium-term fiscal discipline with short-term fiscal flexibility. Assessing the 
SGP against this yardstick, they conclude that, generally speaking, “the pact proved con-
ducive to fiscal discipline” and helped to bring the currency zone’s structural deficit to less 
than half of that of the United States and less than one quarter of Japan’s (ibid.: 23f.). They 
also find that the GSP delivered a “high – but certainly not perfect – degree of fiscal flexi-
bility during the downturn” (ibid.: 24). Beetsma and Debrun (2005), who are, like Annett 
and Jaeger, IMF staff members, present an argument in favour of increasing the pact’s pro-
cedural flexibility to improve welfare. Allowing deviations from the “letter of the rule” 
laid down in the SGP could minimize the additional negative consequences of demand side 
shocks during economic downturns. As the European Commission (2005: 157) lays out, 
demand disturbances have a potentially important impact on output and unemployment in 
the short- to medium-term. The Commission argues that “[t]his, together with the (consen-
sual) finding that labour market outcomes, and the unemployment rate in particular, have 
high persistence, raises the important issue of macroeconomic policy stabilization” (ibid.: 
161). 
Apart from the specific consideration of growth and employment concerns in the Stability 
and Growth Pact, a greater concern for growth employment creation in general is called for 
from all three G3 areas. In combination with a more responsible attitude in the G3 coun-
tries for enhancing growth and reducing volatility for a better functioning international 
financial system, the G3 has a third important responsibility, namely, in providing 
development assistance and in stimulating other sources of finance to enhance growth and 
development and so contribute to a more properly functioning international financial 
system (see World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization 2004: 103). 
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Rules of the international system 
Such changes in G3 policy stances should be embedded in changes in multilateral rules 
and the functioning of international financial agencies. These are discussed in detail in the 
report of the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004: 88ff.), 
the principles of which are: 
• Capital account liberalization should depend on a country’s circumstance to maxi-
mize investment and to avoid volatility. 
• In order to reduce volatility and contagion in emerging markets, the international 
system should have a greater resort to emergency financing. 
• In order to make the international system more coherent, developing countries 
should be better integrated into it through: 
o greater involvement in the reform process of the international financial 
institutions (IFIs); 
o speeding up the process of reform; 
o removing barring caused by new codes to financial market access by 
developing countries; 
o providing a better system for debt reduction. 
An important point in considering the rules of the international system and the policies ap-
plied by the IFIs is that the general context of the international financial landscape has 
changed considerably, this warrants different approaches from the decades of the 1980s 
and 1990s. One of the most salient points is that the continuous opening of trade, despite 
some recent setbacks, and the application of fairly drastic adjustment and stabilization 
policies in the 1980s and 1990s have dampened world wide inflationary tendencies (Akyüz 
2006). In some respect, inflation rates resemble those which were current during the 
Golden Age of development and growth. While a decade ago, many countries belonged to 
the group of countries with an inflation rate of 10 per cent or higher, today very few 
countries belong to this group.19 
Moreover, there are also few signs that inflation will re-emerge. The current opening of 
trade and the international agreements concluded between different countries make it 
unlikely for inflation to soar. Hence prices are fairly stable. But, as we discussed in the 
previous section, greater monetary discipline and price stability have not resulted in finan-
cial and macro-economic stability, while financial liberalization has led to increasingly 
sharp business cycles and sharp fluctuations in economic activity.  
 
19 In 2001 and 2002, roughly 80 per cent of the ca. 180 countries with available data had inflation 
rates below 10 per cent, compared to less than 50 per cent of all countries during most of the mid- to 
late 1970s and early 1980s, and between 50 and 60 per cent of all countries during the first half of 
the 1990s (based on 123 to 180 countries with available data). Today, high inflation is thus a prob-
lem for only a relatively small number of countries, and conditions are not too dissimilar from the 
1960s. Back then, 85 to 90 percent of the ca. 100 to 120 countries with available data had inflation 
rates below 10 per cent (see World Bank, WDI 2005 on CD-Rom). 
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It is, therefore, a logical step to argue that the focus of the international system should shift 
from concerns on price instability to concerns for asset instability. International policies 
have therefore to shift. This would require firstly a greater surveillance by the IMF on asset 
instability and secondly a review of its approach to capital account liberalization, leading 
to an internationally accepted system of managed capital account liberalization. There are 
signs that the international policy agenda is shifting in this direction. This is evident from 
the World Bank (2005b) report cited above, but also from within the IMF. The Fund’s 
Independent Evaluation Unit now sees the role played by the IMF in the past as follows: 
“Throughout the 1990s, the IMF undoubtedly encouraged countries that wanted to move 
ahead with capital account liberalization, and even acted as a cheerleader when it wished to do 
so, especially before the East Asian crisis. […] In multilateral surveillance, the IMF’s analysis 
emphasized the benefits to developing countries of greater access to international capital 
flows, while paying comparatively less attention to the risks inherent in their volatility.” (IMF 
Independent Evaluation Office 2005: 5)   
The same evaluation report also describes a gradual shift in emphasis: 
“More recently, however, the IMF has paid greater attention to various risk factors, including 
the linkage between industrial country policies and international capital flows as well as the 
more fundamental causes and implications of their boom-and-bust cycles. Still, the focus of 
the analysis remains on what emerging market countries should do to cope with the volatility 
of capital flows (for example, in the areas of macroeconomic and exchange rate policy, 
strengthened financial sectors, and greater transparency).” (IMF Independent Evaluation 
Office 2005: 3)   
Policies in developing countries 
Changes in rules and policies at the international level and the current low level of inflation 
would also allow developing countries to undertake more coherent policies in order to 
stimulate development, employment and growth. A potential effective set of policies 
would combine a flexible system of capital controls with a managed real effective ex-
change rate (Diwan 2001, World Bank 2005b, Charlton and Stiglitz 2004). The flexible 
system of capital controls would allow for more coherent national policies to be under-
taken and reduce volatility which has, as we documented earlier, serious consequences not 
only in terms of short-term welfare losses but also in terms of reduced growth potential. 
The aim of a system of a managed real effective exchange rate is to keep the industry and 
the economy in general at high levels of capacity utilization and so aim for full employ-
ment, as we discuss in the following paragraphs. However, before discussing the em-
ployment effects of a system of managed real effective exchange rates, we first need to ad-
dress whether a coherent approach of social and economic policies is above all possible. 
This relates to the so-called ‘policy trilemma’ or ‘unholy trinity’ of international economic 
policies (see Mundell 1963; Cohen 1993; Obstfeld et al. 2004) which states that national 
policy space is circumscribed by the impossibility to pursue the following three policies 
simultaneously: 
• open capital account, 
• fixed exchange rates, 
• an independent monetary policy, 
and that only two out of these three policies can be combined. For example, under a system 
of an open capital account and fixed exchange rates, countries can not pursue an independ-
ent monetary policy since interest rates are determined by world interest levels. Con-
versely, if countries need to undertake an independent monetary policy, they have either to 
revert to flexible exchange rates or opt for a closed capital account. 
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However, some more recent research argues that the policy trilemma, which has been 
guiding national and international policy makers for several decades, can be relaxed by 
avoiding corner solutions. This would imply to go beyond the traditional alternatives of 
fixed versus flexible exchange rates, or open versus closed capital accounts, and to adopt 
intermediate options in these three policy domains – like a capital account management 
through the selective application of capital controls, or a managed real exchange rate (see 
Bradford 2004). For example, in the case of China, research from the IMF argues that 
making the quasi-fixed exchange rate more flexible would allow the country to pursue a 
more independent monetary policy. The same paper also argues for a cautious approach to 
capital account liberalization, given institutional weaknesses of China’s financial system 
(see Prasad et al. 2005). The argument could be extended to many other developing coun-
tries. Rather than abandoning capital controls altogether, they should therefore remain a 
policy tool that can be used selectively.  
Although capital controls have, much like any other policy instrument, not always been 
fully effective in reaching their stated objectives (see Ariyoshi et al. 2000), they have con-
tributed to regaining greater policy autonomy in several cases. For example, controls im-
posed on inflows have helped to reduce their level and to change the composition of in-
flows towards longer maturities in Chile, hence increasing the autonomy of monetary pol-
icy (Gallego et al. 1999; see also de Gregorio et al. 2000). An important side-effect is that 
the level of international reserves can be reduced when the amount of short-term liabilities 
falls, lowering the opportunity cost of reserve holdings. An important lesson is that con-
trols need to have comprehensive coverage and be forcefully implemented to be effective 
(Ariyoshi et al. 2000: 17). The more controversial issue is controls on outflows, but Edison 
and Reinhart (2001) argue that such controls have enabled Malaysia to stabilize exchange 
rates and interest rates during the East Asian crisis and to gain more policy autonomy. 
Kaplan and Rodrik (2001) conclude that the Malaysian approach has led to a faster eco-
nomic recovery and smaller declines in real wages and employment than IMF policies 
would have.20 More generally, if applied soundly, a managed capital account can help to 
avoid financial crises or contain their impact, and hence contribute to a stable investment 
climate, sustained growth and employment creation.  
How could a system of a managed real exchange rate, the second element mentioned ear-
lier, affect employment? Rodrik (2003) and Frenkel (2004) provide three channels. Active 
management of the real exchange rate… 
• will allow for higher capacity utilization in times of unemployment, if it is applied 
in combination with the appropriate mix of macroeconomic and fiscal policies; 
• will stimulate output growth and hence employment, if it is combined with 
appropriate industrial policies, as the experience in various Asian countries has 
shown (Amsden 2001); 
• will affect the sectoral composition of exports towards more labour intensive 
goods, and hence increase the employment elasticity of the economy, as a whole, 
compared to another system.21 
Employing a policy mix with intermediate options such as a managed capital account and a 
managed real exchange rate requires more fine tuning and coherence in policies rather than 
 
20 For a detailed review of the Malaysian experience see Jomo (2005). For a comprehensive discus-
sion of the management of capital flows in developing countries and policy conclusions see 
UNCTAD (2003). 
21 This is a comparative static argument comparing two equilibria under different policy regimes. 
This is independent of a secular decline of employment elasticity, which various observers have 
been discussing. 
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relying on rule-of-thumb policy interventions. While this can help to avoid corner solu-
tions, it necessitates national institutions with explicit mandates and capabilities to achieve 
this. Another possible, supplementary element to relax the policy trilemma would be to in-
clude one or two additional policy instruments to complement the fiscal and monetary 
tools (see also Tinbergen 1970 [1952]: 40f.). Bradford (2004) suggests, for example, social 
pacts or coordinated wage bargaining to hold down inflation and so to “free up” other poli-
cies to aim at growth and employment creation. Also, a greater concern for inequity and a 
reduction of national inequalities could contribute to reducing inflationary pressure and 
could be added either as part of a social pact or as a stand-alone policy instrument (see van 
der Hoeven and Saget 2004). This, too, requires institutional capability. 
Building institutions for coherent policies 
The conclusions of these deliberations is that a coherent approach in national and interna-
tional financial policies to stimulate employment growth is well possible, but requires dif-
ferent rules, better fine tuning of different components of national policies, and appropriate 
institutions. For national institutions to function well, one can point to two distinct national 
configurations: Theoretically, one configuration would be a repressive state with a strong 
and autonomous bureaucracy that is able to coordinate a well functioning and coherent set 
of policies. The other would be a national system of consensus and willingness for policy 
dialogue that can design a coherent set of policies that are acceptable to citizens, and can 
therefore be implemented without resort to authoritarian methods. 
The authoritarian path is neither desirable nor viable in the long run; it would often mean 
the violation of basic human rights (such as freedom of speech and association), and would 
not be internationally accepted either (see the report of the Commission on Human Secu-
rity 2003). Hence the configuration of an open and consensus prone society is the only fea-
sible option in the long run. Building institutions that formulate policies in a consensus-
driven and democratic way is neither a straightforward nor a simple task. But then, as the 
widespread failure of implementing structural adjustment policies has shown, neither are 
orthodox policy packages. One obstacle is that reaching consensus is particularly difficult 
in unequal societies. Hence, by giving more attention to distributional issues, policy can 
reduce inequality and lay the ground to the better implementation of economic policies and 
to greater policy coherence.  
Labour market institutions can play an important role in achieving this objective. Van der 
Hoeven and Saget (2004) argue for three efficiency criteria to evaluate the efficiency of la-
bour market policies, namely allocative efficiency (matching supply and demand to reduce 
unemployment), dynamic efficiency (quality of the future labour force) and equity effi-
ciency (containing inequalities). Many neoclassical economists evaluate labour market 
systems only on the basis of allocative efficiency, but Freeman (2000) observes in evalu-
ating labour market institutions in more advanced countries, that the first order result of la-
bour market institutions is distributional and the second order result is economic effi-
ciency. Therefore, societies do not have to decide, on economic efficiency grounds, what 
type of labour market system to adopt, and can let distributional considerations play an im-
portant role in designing an appropriate labour market system. Dagdeviren at al. (2002) 
demonstrate that these need not be a trade-off between redistribution and growth, and that 
national socio-economic structures should determine the proper mix of growth and redis-
tributive policies. This point was recently underscored by the United Nations’ Report on 
the World Social Situation (United Nations 2005). 
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Statistical Annex  
Annex Graph 1: Countries with Capital Controls, 1980-2001 (in % of total IMF membership) 
 
Source: IMF Independent Evaluation Office (2005). Based on a one (controlled) or zero (not controlled) classification (covering all 
capital account transactions), as provided by the AREAER. There was a definitional change from 1997 to 1998. 
Annex Graph 2: National Regulatory Changes towards FDI, 1991-2003  
 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004, p. 8. 
Annex Graph 3: FDI Inflows by Economic Grouping, 1980-2003 (in billion current US$) 
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Annex Table 1: Gross Private Capital Flows, 1977-2004 (in % of GDP)  
 
 1977-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
World 6.2 7.7 9.2 11.2 18.5 28.4 22.0 21.1 24.5 28.4 
High income 6.4 8.1 10.1 11.8 20.4 32.3 24.6 23.4 27.5 32.0 
Low & middle income 5.3 5.5 4.7 7.6 10.4 11.4 11.2 10.8 11.3 11.9 
     Middle income 6.5 6.4 5.2 8.2 11.2 11.9 12.0 11.6 12.1 12.2 
     Low income 1.7 2.1 2.7 4.2 5.4 7.8 6.1 6.2 6.9 .. 
East Asia & Pacific  3.1 3.8 8.0 10.5 12.8 10.3 9.1 11.8 9.4 
Europe & Central Asia 4.0 2.5 6.2 .. 11.9 14.5 13.1 14.1 16.4 18.8 
Latin America & Caribbean 7.1 9.5 7.2 9.2 11.8 10.8 12.6 13.3 9.8 10.4 
Middle East & North Africa 7.4 3.2 2.9 7.2 5.5 5.9 .. .. .. .. 
South Asia 0.4 0.6 1.2 2.9 3.8 6.5 5.0 4.2 5.4 .. 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.8 4.1 5.6 6.9 13.5 13.4 16.1 13.3 11.5 9.5 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators online database, as of May 2006 (Washington, DC, 2006). 
Note: Gross Private Capital Flows are defined as “the sum of the absolute values of direct, portfolio, and other investment inflows and outflows 
recorded in the balance of payments financial account, excluding changes in the assets and liabilities of monetary authorities and general govern-
ment” (ibid.). Figures for the periods from 1997 to 1999 are arithmetic averages; figures in italics refer to 1982-1984 (East Asia & Pacific) and 1985-
1988 (Europe & Central Asia), respectively. 
 
 
Annex Table 2: Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1977-2004 (in % of GDP)  
 
 1977-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
World 23.9 22.8 22.2 21.7 21.6 21.8 21.2 20.3 20.4 .. 
High income 23.8 22.8 22.1 21.4 21.2 21.6 20.9 19.9 19.8 .. 
Low & middle income 24.2 23.1 22.8 23.3 23.4 22.9 22.5 22.2 23.0 23.9 
     Middle income 25.2 24.0 23.4 23.7 23.8 23.2 22.7 22.4 23.1 24.2 
     Low income 18.1 18.3 19.3 20.4 21.0 20.9 21.3 21.4 21.8 22.5 
East Asia & Pacific 27.8 28.0 28.1 31.1 31.4 29.8 30.1 31.0 33.1 33.8 
Europe & Central Asia .. .. .. 22.3 21.8 21.1 20.5 19.6 19.5 20.1 
Latin America & Caribbean 22.9 20.6 19.5 19.0 19.7 20.1 18.8 17.8 17.9 19.5 
Middle East & North Africa 29.7 26.0 22.5 21.5 21.8 21.4 21.4 21.4 22.3 22.9 
South Asia 17.5 18.9 20.6 21.4 21.7 21.7 21.5 21.6 21.9 22.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 24.6 21.7 17.8 17.5 17.7 16.7 17.6 17.7 18.1 18.4 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators online database, as of May 2006 (Washington, DC, 2006). 
Note: Gross Fixed Capital Formation is defined to include “land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment 
purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial 
and industrial buildings. According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation” (ibid.). Figures for the 
periods from 1997 to 1999 are arithmetic averages. 
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Annex Table 3: Net Private Capital Flows to Low and Middle Income Countries, 1975-2003 (in billion current US$)  
 
 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Low & middle income 33.6 47.6 30.6 102.2 235.5 186.0 174.3 160.3 199.4 
     Middle income 30.5 41.9 24.6 94.2 221.0 170.9 160.8 146.3 177.9 
     Low income 3.1 5.7 6.1 8.0 14.4 15.1 13.5 14.0 21.5 
East Asia & Pacific 3.7 8.4 9.8 42.2 69.0 35.9 36.6 47.1 62.0 
Europe & Central Asia 3.3 5.5 5.0 12.6 41.5 42.0 37.7 55.4 67.1 
Latin America & Caribbean 18.9 25.5 5.9 38.2 102.9 82.7 71.3 35.6 41.1 
Middle East & North Africa 4.5 2.8 4.1 2.2 3.3 5.3 9.4 8.1 4.8 
South Asia 0.1 1.7 3.7 4.7 6.9 9.7 5.2 6.5 11.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.2 3.8 2.2 2.3 11.8 10.4 14.0 7.6 13.2 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005 on CD-Rom (Washington, DC, 2005), based on series ‘Private capital flows, net total 
(current US$)’. 
Note: Net Private Capital Flows are defined to “consist of private debt and nondebt flows. Private debt flows include commercial bank lending, bonds, 
and other private credits; nondebt private flows are foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment. Data are in current U.S. dollars” (ibid.).  
 
 
Annex Table 4: International Reserve Holdings by Low and Middle Income Countries, 1977-2004 (in % of GNI)  
 
 1977-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Low & middle income 6.0 5.0 4.4 6.9 11.0 12.2 13.3 16.0 18.5 20.7 
     Middle income 5.7 4.4 3.6 4.6 7.2 9.1 10.2 12.8 15.3 17.0 
     Low income 6.0 5.1 4.6 7.3 11.6 12.7 13.9 16.5 19.1 21.4 
East Asia & Pacific 6.4 7.8 8.3 11.9 15.6 16.9 18.7 21.4 25.1 30.6 
      excl. China 10.1 8.4 10.4 15.1 18.8 22.7 23.6 23.3 24.0 26.0 
      China 3.5 7.2 6.8 9.0 14.1 14.5 16.9 20.7 25.5 32.3 
Europe & Central Asia .. .. .. .. 10.1 13.8 14.4 16.8 18.3 19.2 
Latin America & Caribbean 8.3 6.7 6.2 7.2 8.9 8.4 8.8 10.1 11.9 11.7 
Middle East & North Africa 21.3 11.1 5.8 11.8 13.8 13.7 15.5 19.0 22.4 22.9 
South Asia 6.1 4.7 3.8 4.7 6.7 7.9 9.3 13.2 16.1 17.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.2 5.0 4.2 5.7 8.5 11.8 11.8 11.4 10.3 13.0 
Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, online database as of May 2006 (Washington, DC, 2006); based on series ‘International 
Reserves (US$)’ and ‘Gross National Income (US$)’; international reserves include ‘monetary authorities holdings of special drawing rights (SDRs), 
its reserve position in the IMF, its holdings of foreign exchange, and its holdings of gold (valued at year-end London prices)’. 
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